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Presidency has special prerogatives when it comes to suggesting amendments to the Commission proposal. By exploiting the possibility that not all member states have to agree to its proposal under the qualified majority rule, and its access to privileged information about member states' preferences and possible outcome options, the Presidency has the potential to present acceptable 'compromise' proposals that move the final negotiation outcome closer to its own favoured policy.
The second use of the term refers to agenda-setting power as the power to influence the allocation of the Council's political attention over specific policy issues by distributing limited time and space resources for meetings. I refer to this type of power as the Presidency's scheduling power. During its half-year term, the Presidency organises the Council's work. The Presidency decides who meets for how long and when. Meetings at all levels of the Council's organisational hierarchy are convened by the Presidency. The Presidency does not only determine the timing and length of working party, committee, and ministerial meetings, but also the content of discussions. By drafting the agenda of meetings and by chairing them, the Presidency decides whether a topic will be discussed and how much meeting time will be spent on discussing it. Little empirical research has focused on the effects of the Presidency's scheduling power (Tallberg 2003; Warntjen 2007; Warntjen 2013a; Warntjen 2013b) , even though the allocation of attention to a certain policy problem logically precedes and therefore serves as a precondition for any influence on the content of decision-making outcomes. As further elaborated below, the two types of agenda-setting power are the result of distinct activities, which differ in their sources of authority, motivations, and causal mechanisms.
In empirical terms, the study is exclusively concerned with the Presidency's scheduling power. In particular, the study addresses the question about the extent to which the Presidency has the power to emphasise or de-emphasise the attention devoted by the Council 3 to certain policy issues. To clarify the research objective, the study first develops a conceptual framework that is based on insights from Tallberg's (2003) discussion of the Presidency's agenda-shaping powers and Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) general theoretical approach to the study of policy agendas and the allocation of political attention. In line with the Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) view, the Council can be seen as being continuously confronted with a potentially infinite number of public and political demands. Yet like other political institutions, it holds only a limited capacity for organisational information processing. In such a high-information environment, the Presidency's scheduling power acts as a filter to determine the allocation of the Council's scarce time and space resources to attend to a selective number of issues. As special cases, the Presidency's scheduling power includes the complete inclusion of previously latent issues on and the complete exclusion of previously salient issues from the agenda; but most of the time, the level of attention granted to an issue by the Presidency will be a matter of degree.
2 Of course, the mere existence of scheduling power does not necessarily mean that governments use that power to disproportionally progress their own favoured issues. Almost by definition, the Presidency's filtering of external demands will lead to disproportionate and biased allocation of attention, but whether and to what extent this bias will favour the progression of the Presidency's own priorities is ultimately an empirical question.
To shed more light on this matter, I employ a novel dataset of political attention in the Presidency periods are also of substantive size.
SCHEDULING VS. PROPOSAL MAKING POWER
The Presidency of the Council lacks any major formal rights that would lead us to expect that it has a strong influence on the process and outcome of Council decision-making. Neither the treaties nor the Council's rules of procedure provide the Presidency with exclusive rights to schedule meetings, determine agendas, or suggest amendments to the Commission's proposal (Warntjen 2006) . On the contrary, the treaties guarantee that Council meetings can be convened at the request of any one member state or even at the request of the Commission. Also, the Council's rules of procedure specify that any member state or the Commission can demand the inclusion of an item on the Council's agenda. 4 Finally, the formal rules do not specify any distinct proposal or amendment rights for the Presidency, implying that it does not enjoy any special prerogatives in that respect.
Indeed, the Council's rules of procedure are generally silent on the conduct of meetings. Even the general rule that all meetings of Council bodies are to be chaired by the Presidency can only be derived from the explicit definition of exceptions in the Council's rules of procedure. However, the absence of formal rules does not mean that Council negotiations are not subject to informal norms and role expectations. In the case of the Council, participants generally accept that it is the task of the Presidency to manage the 5 conduct of meetings and organise debate. To aid the timely and successful conclusion of negotiations, the Presidency is also supposed to act as a broker between disagreeing factions.
Providing compromise proposals that are able to reconcile the interests of those factions is a major instrument to ensure an efficient outcome of negotiations. Yet, the Presidency might also be able to move the final negotiations outcome closer to its own preferred policy position by suggesting compromise proposals that favour its own views. An informal norm of neutrality is supposed to counter-act such tendencies (e.g. Niemann and Mak 2010) . The
Presidency is expected to be 'neutral and impartial' (Council 2006: 14 (Council 2006: 14) From a purely practical point of view, the ability to programme the Council's work over a number of months in advance is necessitated by the need to ensure the availability of the required meeting rooms and interpreters. Of course, just like the Presidency's proposal power, its scheduling power is also conditional and subject to a potential override by other member states or the Commission. In the last resort, the formal rules that each member state or the Commission can request a meeting of the Council and the inclusion of specific items on the agenda stands and can be referred to by those actors to enforce their will. However,
given the normative and practical constraints, the cost of interference with the Presidency's organisation of the Council's work is high. In addition, the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency ensures that any issue another member state or the Commission would like to see discussed is blocked from the agenda at most temporarily. Thus, the costs of forcing an issue on the agenda or convening an additional meeting are considerable, while the potential benefits are small. Table 1 summarises the conceptual discussion so far. 
Goal

Implementation of policy preferences Implementation of policy priorities
Means
Making compromise proposals Allocation of time and meeting space
The Presidency's proposal-making and scheduling power differ according to their source of authority, the goal with which the Presidency employs them, and the practical means to achieve them. Proposal-making power is not supported by formal rules, but rests on tradition, convention, and informal norms that grant the Presidency's proposals an elevated status. In contrast, the rules of procedure clearly specify the duty of the Presidency to organise the meetings and agendas of the Council. Thus, the Presidency's scheduling power rests on a comparatively firmer footing than its proposal-making power, even if other formal rules partly contradict it. The two powers also differ clearly in the pursuit of the type of goal for which they might be employed. The exercise of proposal-making power might be used to bias the outcome of decision-making in favour of the Presidency's policy preferences. The exercise of scheduling power might be used to progress discussions on some policy issues at the expense of others in line with the Presidency's priorities. In contrast to a bias in distributive decision-making outcomes, the differential progression of policy issues does not 8 necessarily lead to obvious winners and losers. Thus, the consequences of exercising scheduling power are generally more benign and less likely to incite counter-acting reactions by other member states or the Commission. As a result, the pursuit of particular priorities by the Presidency is considered legitimate, whereas the pursuit of particular preferences is not.
Finally, proposal-making power and scheduling power differ in the practical means through which they are executed. Proposal-making power relies on the Presidency making proposals to find a compromise between disagreeing coalitions. Scheduling power works through the allocation of scarce time and meeting space resources.
EXISTING RESEARCH FINDINGS
Although the consequences of the Presidency's scheduling power are likely to be more pronounced and visible, most recent research has focused on the consequences of its proposal-making power. Schalk et al. (2007) , Tallberg (2004) , Thomson (2008) , and
Warntjen (2008) find that holding the Presidency at the time when a decision is adopted increases a country's influence on policy outcomes. Aksoy (2010) concludes that holding the Presidency during European Union (EU) budget and financial perspective negotiations increases the share of money received by a country. Only Arregui and Thomson (2009) suggest that the influence of the Presidency might have waned with the increase in the number of member states in 2004. All in all, most existing research finds that the Presidency confers some additional influence on member states, even though its effects seem to be rather modest in size (Aksoy 2010; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Thomson 2008). 6 Despite the rather more favourable conditions for the Presidency to exercise scheduling power, little research has examined the extent to which the Presidency is able to emphasise or de-emphasise the attention devoted to different policy issues. Alexandrova and Timmermans (2013) were particularly successful in advancing the negotiations. Of particular relevance for the current study, his research demonstrates that the scheduling of additional meetings was one of the mechanisms relied upon by Presidencies to make progress on the legislative files.
Building on these promising results, the current study examines a wider cross-sectoral domain, covering all policy areas, and a process (i.e. meeting time) rather than an outcome measure (e.g. legislative decisions or collective policy statements) of the Presidency's scheduling power, which shortens the causal chain connecting priorities to the dependent variable and thus allows for a more direct empirical test.
DATA AND METHOD
To assess the distribution of the Council's political attention, this study relies on a dataset of the timing and length of Council working party meetings between 1 January 1995 and 31 In distinguishing policy areas, I followed the Council's own categorisation scheme that it uses to structure its lists of preparatory bodies. This categorisation scheme corresponds to the different sectoral formations of the Council. At the beginning of the study period, the One weakness of this approach is that any Presidency period effect might be the composite result of internally and externally induced priorities. In other words, the causal effect of internally induced priorities cannot be identified unambiguously and is possibly overstated. However, the extent to which environmental factors confound the results depends on the degree of their co-variation with six-month Presidency periods. Many external pressures last for a much shorter or much longer periods of time. Still, the analysis below can 14 best be described as a 'hoop test ' (van Evera 1997: 31) . The absence of a substantial Presidency period effect decisively rejects the scheduling power hypothesis; yet a finding of a substantial Presidency period effect does not provide very strong support for it. In practice, a research design can only be evaluated in comparison to feasible alternatives (Gerring 2011 ).
Arguably, a variance component analysis that delivers a decisive negative test is more valuable than a correlational study with an at best imperfectly measured independent variable that leads to neither a credible rejection of the hypothesis in the case of a negative test result nor credible support in the case of a positive one.
THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENCY PERIODS
In Effectively, each analysis assumes that the total variance around the grand mean can be decomposed into variability due to differences in Presidency periods, due to month of the year, and due to idiosyncratic fluctuations specific to a certain month (i.e. the error term). Assessing the validity of his findings for a broader range of cases and across different policy areas is a promising task for future research.
Indeed, the current study suggests that significant variation exists across policy areas in the degree to which the Presidency enjoys scheduling power. To some extent, these differences might well be quasi-mechanical consequences of differences in the overall level of activity across policy areas. Areas with a generally broad policy scope are less likely to experience large relative changes over time than areas with a generally narrow scope.
Because areas with a broad policy scope (e.g. Foreign Policy) involve many constitutive issues, any increase in the emphasis of one issue (e.g. human rights) might be easily cancelled out by less emphasis on another one (e.g. international terrorism).
Another, more substantive explanation concerns differences in the organisational structure of the Council. The number of working parties and their degree of specialisation varies considerably across policy areas. The area of Environment is an extreme example: a single working party deals with all 'domestic' environmental policy issues. Given its wide policy scope, the working party is essentially in constant session and, by convention, meets 2 Thus, the concept of scheduling power is related to but narrower than Tallberg's (2003) concept of agenda-shaping power. Amongst Tallberg's (2003) three ways in which Presidencies can shape the Council's agenda, scheduling power coincides to a large extent with Tallberg's 'agenda-structuring'. However, the concept of scheduling power also includes the complete omission of issues from the agenda, which is part of Tallberg's 'agenda exclusion', and the inclusion of new issues, which is part of Tallberg's 'agenda-setting'.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA AND RESEARCH MATERIALS
not priorities for what the government would like to achieve as part of its half-year Council Presidency term at the EU level. Measures based on those sources might suffer less from endogeneity problems. Yet they are at best indirect proxies for the concept to be measured and, as such, are likely to be affected by systematic measurement error. Finally, speeches tend to be more selective than manifestos. Indeed, Presidency presentations of their work programmes to the European Parliament do not mention certain major topics at all (Warntjen 2007) . Therefore, the discussion in the text is focused on Presidency work programmes as the source most likely to produce valid priority data. 12 As explained above, the month of August has been dropped due to the lack of any significant meeting activity during that month.
13 See Table A1 in the online appendix for the complete numerical estimation results from the mixed effects regressions.
